Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs. The formal literature has exclusively focused on two selection rules: selection proportional to seat share (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) , and selection in order of seat share (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988) . In this paper we use a new data set on government formation attempts in 12 multi-party democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data. We¯nd that while there is no empirical support for selection in order of seat share, proportional selection may serve as a good¯rst approximation. However, our results also indicate that formateur selection exhibits a signi¯cant incumbency e®ect: ceteris paribus, the former prime minister's party is more likely to be selected to attempt the formation of the next government.
Introduction
The de¯ning characteristic of parliamentary democracies is the government's accountability to the legislature. In his classical study on the British constitution Bagehot expressed this insight in the following way.
\The main function of the House of Commons is one which we know quite well, though our common constitutional speech does not recognize it. The House of Commons is an electoral chamber... " (Bagehot 1963 (Bagehot [1867 ; p.36).
On closer inspection, however, most parliamentary democracies deviate from this textbook case. First of all, strictly speaking most governments are not elected by the legislature, if by an election we mean the selection of one or more candidates for public o±ce. Only in a few countries, Germany for instance, is the prime minister or the cabinet elected. In some parliamentary democracies, for example Italy, governments have to pass a vote of investiture. Other countries, such as Norway, dispense even with this formality. Here, an incumbent government may stay in o±ce without further procedures until it loses a vote of censure. Whether an explicit vote is required or not, in most parliamentary democracies the chamber is presented with a proposal for a government that has to be rejected or accepted in its entirety.
But does this matter? After all, no matter how a government is formed, once it assumes o±ce it needs to maintain the con¯dence of the chamber. However, there are usually more than one viable government that could win a con¯dence vote in the chamber. This makes the designation of a proposer (of a potential new government) a decision with substantial political consequences, especially in multi-party systems where elections alone are not su±cient to determine the choice of a government.
Recent advances in legislative bargaining theory (Baron and Ferejohn 1989 , Baron 1991 , Romer and Rosenthal 1978 have captured this insight formally through proposer models.
In these models the chamber has the choice between a proposal and the status quo.
1 But since all proposals contained in the status quo' s majority win-set would be accepted, the actor who actually makes the proposal can exploit her proposal power to achieve her highest payo® among the alternatives in the win-set. Applied to the case of cabinet formation (Baron 1991) this means that the party that successfully assembles a cabinet will receive additional gains from proposing. That is, not only will the proposer or her party be included in the government for sure, but she will also receive a higher payo® than had she been included in the cabinet without being the proposer.
This raises the question of who has the right to propose a potential government to the legislature. The literature has used the term formateur to denote the person who proposes a potential government for chamber approval (e.g. Scho¯eld 1990, Laver and Shepsle 1996) . Most of the time the formateur will also be the prime minister designate. The process typically begins with the head of state selecting a member of parliament or another public gure to try to form a government. If the selected individual is unsuccessful in his attempt, then the head of state makes a second selection, and so on until a government is inaugurated.
Hence, understanding the process according to which parties (or more precisely individual members of parties) are selected to make government proposals is a important step in the analysis of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We refer to this process as a coalitional bargaining procedure.
Since the designation of a formateur is precariously located between elections and government selection, many parliamentary democracies have chosen to treat the formateur selection process as ostensibly non-partisan. In some countries the head of state, usually a monarch or elected president, designates the formateur. In other countries this task is delegated to an informateur, usually a senior, experienced, \elder statesman". We are not aware of any detailed study on the motives or behavior of these actors. Following Laver and Scho¯eld (1996) as well as Baron (1991 Baron ( , 1993 we assume that the recognition of the actors who can propose new cabinets is non-partisan. That is, the choice of a formateur can be summarized by a selection rule. That is, a deterministic or probabilistic rule that determines who is chosen as the next proposer given the composition of the chamber and the history of previous attempts. Sometimes coalitional bargaining procedures are embodied in the constitution, as in Greece where the largest party must be chosen as the formateur. Most of the times, however, they are re°ected in conventions and norms.
At a theoretical level, this issue has been dealt with in two distinct ways. According to the coalitional bargaining procedure suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) in each period formateurs are assumed to be selected randomly proportional to seat share. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) on the other hand consider a coalitional bargaining procedure by order statistics. That is,¯rst the party with the largest seat share is selected, then the second largest, and so on. We call the¯rst rule proportional selection, the second selection-in-order.
Essentially any (noncooperative) model of government formation in the literature builds on one of these two procedures (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks 1988 , Baron 1991 , Baron and Diermeier 1998 , Laver and Shepsle 1996 .
The choice of a coalitional bargaining procedure is not without consequences. In general, bargaining models are extremely sensitive to the speci¯cation of the protocol that governs the right of players to make o®ers and countero®ers. 2 In the context of a bargaining model of government formation, Baron (1991) shows that the equilibrium predictions of the model crucially depend on whether parties are randomly recognized to make proposals or the order of proposals is¯xed.
The details of proposer selection institutions may also have profound consequences for the electoral process. Baron (1991) to date there has been no empirical analysis of the process with which parties are selected to make government proposals. The goal of this paper is to take a¯rst step toward¯lling this gap. To achieve this goal we collect a new data set containing detailed information on the process of government formation in 12 multi-party democracies in the postwar period.
We then use this data set to estimate a simple econometric model of coalitional bargaining procedures.
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, there is no support in the data for the coalitional bargaining procedure proposed by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) . Second, the procedure proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) has some support in the data. In particular, our estimates show that on average the elasticity of the probability that a party is selected to make a government proposal with respect to its size is close to one.
However, our analysis also shows that in order to better approximate what we observe in the data, this procedure has to be amended to incorporate incumbency e®ects. In particular, our estimates show that, holding everything else constant, the party that was successful in forming the previous government is more likely to be chosen to try to form the next government, and the incumbency premium tends to be large.
Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a newly collected data set, which contains information on <<Figure 3 about here>>
In Figure 3 , we present a histogram of the size (i.e., the seat share) of the parties selected to make government proposals for all attempts. 4 As we can see from this¯gure, there is a positive relation between a party's size and its recognition probability. Larger parties are more likely to be selected to make government proposals than smaller parties. This observation provides some prima facie empirical support for the proportional selection rule proposed by Baron and Ferejohn. <<Figures 4, 5, 6 about here>>
Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict the histogram of the relative rank of the parties selected to make government proposals with respect to their size, for the¯rst, second, and third attempt, respectively. According to the selection-in-order rule we would expect the largest party to be always selected in the¯rst attempt, the second largest in the second attempt and so on. However, Figures 4-6 clearly show that the largest party is always more likely to be selected to make government proposals for all attempts. Moreover, for all attempts we observe a negative relation between a party's relative rank in terms of size and its recognition probability. Hence, the selection-in-order rule proposed by Austen-Smith and Banks appears to be rejected by the data.
The last important feature of the data concerns the relation between incumbency and recognition probabilities (Laver and Shepsle 1996) . For all attempts, a member of the party of the former prime minister was selected to make a government proposal 62% of the times.
This event occurred in 68% of the cases in the¯rst attempt and in 54% of the cases in all other attempts. This observation may be suggestive of the presence of an incumbency advantage. However, a deeper investigation of this as well as the other issues we identi¯ed in our descriptive analysis of the data requires that we specify an econometric model where the recognition probabilities are allowed to simultaneously depend on the parties' sizes, their relative ranks, and their incumbency status.
Statistical Model
Our analysis focuses on the process leading to the formation of a new government which follows the resignation of an incumbent government (possibly because of a general election or because of a no-con¯dence vote in the parliament). Let j index a country. For each observation in the sample, let N j = f1; :::; n j g denote the set of parties represented in the parliament in country j, where 1 denotes the largest party, 2 the second largest party, and so on, and n j denotes the number of parties represented in the parliament in country j.
Let ¦ j = (¼ 1 ; :::; ¼ n j ) denote the vector of the parties' seat shares in the parliament. To economize on notation, we suppress the subscript indexing an observation. Note, however, that both N j and ¦ j can vary across observations and are not constant for each country.
After the termination of an incumbent government, the head of state selects a formateur, denoted by | 1 , to try to form a new government. If the formateur is a member of parliament or is formally a±liated with a party represented in parliament, then we identify the formateur with his party, in which case | 1 2 N j . If instead the formateur is not a member of parliament and is not formally a±liated with any party represented in parliament, then we let | 1 = 0 and adopt the normalization ¼ 0 = 0.
5 If the formateur is successful in gathering the necessary support in the parliament to sustain its proposal, then a government is inaugurated. If not, then the head of state appoints a new formateur (possibly from the same party as the previous formateur), and so on, until an agreement is reached and a government is inaugurated. We let | t 2 f N j = N j [ f0g denote the formateur at time t, where t = 1; 2; ::: indexes the government formation attempt.
In this paper, we do not try to explain which coalition forms the government or how long it takes to form a government. 6 Rather, we are interested in understanding how parties are selected to make government proposals. In particular, our goal is to empirically assess the extent to which a party's size and its relative ranking in terms of size a®ect its probability of being selected to try to form a government. Furthermore, we want to investigate whether a party that has been successful in forming the previous government faces a higher probability of being selected to try to form the next government, and, if so, we want to quantify such incumbency premium.
To achieve these goals we combine the procedures suggested by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , and Laver and Shepsle (1996) into a tractable econometric model. In particular, we assume that the head of state in non-strategic and non-partisan (Laver and Shepsle 1996) and we approximate the behavior of the head of state using a conditional logit model (McFadden 1973) . 7 This implies that for each government formation attempt t = 1; 2; :::; we can write the probability that the head of state in country j selects 5 Occasionally, public¯gures that are not a±liated with any party are selected as formateurs. In our data set, this event occurs in 4% of the cases.
6 For analyses of these issues see, for example, Merlo (1997) , Diermeier and Merlo (1998) , and Diermeier and Van Roozendaal (1998).
7 For a structural interpretation of this speci¯cation using a random utility model see McFadden (1973) .
, t = 1; 2; :::
where f i 2 f0; 1g is an indicator variable denoting whether party i is the party of the former prime minister (in which case f i = 1), and d it 2 f0; 1g is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if i = t and zero otherwise. This speci¯cation captures the intuition that although larger parties may be more likely to be selected as a formateur than smaller parties (¯1 t ), there may be an incumbency bias (¯2 t ). It also incorporates a probabilistic version of selection in order (¯3 t ) by allowing for the possibility that the largest party is more likely to be selected¯rst, the second largest party second, and so on. 8 Note that the coe±cients of the model are not restricted to be the same across attempts, as for example incumbency e®ects may become less important as a negotiation progresses.
Results
We estimate our model using standard Maximum Likelihood techniques. The estimated coe±cients of three model speci¯cations for the¯rst and second attempt are reported in Table 1 . 9 In the speci¯cation of Column 1 we impose the restrictions¯2 t =¯3 t = 0 for all t. In the speci¯cation of Column 2 we impose the restriction¯3 t = 0 for all t. Estimates of the coe±cients of the unrestricted model are reported in Column 3. Loosely speaking, the speci¯cation of Column 1 corresponds to pure proportional selection. That is, the likelihood that a party is selected as a formateur only depends on its size. The speci¯cation of Column 2 corresponds to a modi¯ed version of proportional selection where incumbency e®ects are taken into account. The speci¯cation of Column 3 also incorporates features of the selectionin-order rule.
As we can see from Table 1 , our estimates from the conditional logit model con¯rm our initial¯ndings.
<<Table 1 about here>> 8 As we pointed out in the previous section of the paper, the strict (deterministic) version of the selectionin-order rule is immediately rejected by the data.
The coe±cient associated with the dummy variable d it is not statistically di®erent from zero at conventional signi¯cance levels for any attempt. On the other hand, the coe±cients associated with the variables ¼ i and f i are statistically di®erent from zero at conventional signi¯cance levels for all attempts. Furthermore, Likelihood Ratio tests reject the general speci¯cation of Column 3 in favor of the speci¯cation of Column 2, while the speci¯cation of Column 2 cannot be rejected in favor of the speci¯cation of Column 1 at conventional signi¯cance levels. These results suggest that after controlling for the size of a party, its relative rank with respect to size does not a®ect its probability of being selected to make a government proposal. That is, even a probabilistic version of the selection-in-order rule is rejected by the data. Incumbency e®ects, on the other hand, appear to be important. In the remainder of the paper we thus impose the restriction¯3 t = 0 for all t.
It is well known that unlike in regression models, the estimates of the coe±cients of a conditional logit model do not have any direct interpretation (e.g. Greene 1997 ). In particular, they do not directly re°ect the marginal e®ects of the independent variables on the choice probabilities. Hence, they cannot be used directly to quantify the elasticity of the probability a party is selected to make a government proposal with respect to the party's size, or to measure the incumbency premium. Not only does the elasticity with respect to size depend on the value of the independent variables, i.e.
but the choice set f N j di®ers across observations (so that the number of terms in the denominator in equation (1) is di®erent across observations). To deal with the latter issue, we¯x the number of parties and compute a separate estimate of the elasticity of the recognition probability with respect to size and of the incumbency bias for each possible number of parties in our sample. To deal with the former issue, we compute these estimates for all possible values of the independent variables in the sample and then average across observations.
The¯rst question we would like to answer is: If the size of one party increases by 1%, by what percentage does its recognition probability increase? Providing an answer to this question is rather important. For example, proportional selection implies that if the size of a party increases by 1%, its recognition probability also increases by 1%. This implies that a party cannot increase its chances of proposing by splitting, and two parties cannot get more joint proposal chances by merging. To answer this question we present Table 2 .
<<Table 2 about here>>
As we can see from Table 2 , the average estimate of the elasticity of the recognition probability with respect to size for all attempts is equal to 0.91. The standard error associated with this estimate is equal to 0.10. 10 Hence, the null hypothesis that the elasticity is equal to 1 cannot be rejected at standard signi¯cance levels. This result o®ers some empirical support for proportional selection as a reasonable approximation of average selection frequencies.
However, individual estimates of this elasticity by attempt and number of parties represented in the parliament display substantial variation. For example, we see that the elasticity tends to increase between the¯rst and the second attempt and to decrease with the number of parties.
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The second question we would like to answer is this: Consider the party that was successful in forming the previous government (i.e., the party of the former prime minister).
Let that party be denoted by i 2 N j and let P j it be its recognition probability for attempt t = 1; 2; :::. Holding everything else constant, let f P j it be party i's average recognition probability if we remove the incumbency advantage from party i and we give it to one of the other parties`2 N j for all`6 = i. How large is the di®erence in the two probabilities{i.e., what
Answering this question provides a measure of the incumbency premium. The answer is presented in Table 3 .
<<Table 3 about here>> As we can see from Table 3 , the average estimate of the incumbency premium is rather large and is equal to 0.27. This means that controlling for size, on average an incumbent 10 The standard error was computed using the Delta Method (e.g. Greene 1997) , since the estimate of the elasticity of the recognition probability with respect to size is a function of the estimates of the model parameters (see equation (2)).
party is 27% more likely to be selected to make a government proposal than if it were not the incumbent party. The standard error associated with this estimate (computed using the Delta Method) is equal to 0.04. Hence, the average incumbency premium is statistically di®erent from zero at conventional signi¯cance levels, and its 95% con¯dence interval is equal to [0.19, 0.35] . As it was true for the size elasticity, however, there is substantial variation in the individual estimates of the incumbency premium by attempt and number of parties.
For instance, the incumbency premium tends to decrease between the¯rst and the second attempt.
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The literature on government formation usually assumes that formateur selection rules are stationary. That is, the probability that a party is selected is the same no matter whether the government formation process immediately follows after a general election or whether it occurs in the middle of a parliament's life-span. Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) , however,¯nd that formation processes last considerably longer if they start immediately after an election.
To assess the robustness of our¯ndings with respect to the timing of the government formation process, we reestimated our conditional logit model using two di®erent subsam- Tables 4 and 5, for each subsample we compute the elasticity of the recognition probability with respect to size and the incumbency premium together with their standard errors. What we¯nd is that the average size elasticity is equal to 1.11 for government formations immediately following a general election and is equal to 0.76 for government formations in the middle of a legislature.
13 The standard errors associated with these estimates are 0.16 and 0.13, respectively. Hence, neither elasticity is statistically di®erent from 1 at standard signi¯cance levels. This result provides more evidence in support of the proportional selection rule, regardless of whether a government formation occurs immediately after a general election or between elections.
With respect to the incumbency premium, the average estimates we obtain are 0.18 for government formations immediately following a general election and 0.35 for government formations in the middle of a legislature. The standard errors associated with these estimates are 0.05 and 0.07, respectively. Hence, both these estimates are statistically di®erent from zero at conventional signi¯cance levels. However, the average incumbency premium after an election is larger than the average incumbency premium between elections, but this di®erence is barely statistically signi¯cant.
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Conclusion
In this article we have presented an empirical analysis of formateur selection rules. In particular, we have tried to determine which of the selection rules commonly used in formal models of coalition bargaining can best account for the empirical regularities of formateur selection. Our analysis yielded the following results.
(1) There is little empirical support for selection in order of seat shares. Rather in all formation attempts the largest party is most likely to be selected as a proposer.
(2) A proportional selection rule provides a reasonably good approximation of the data.
In particular, we could not reject the null hypothesis that on average a party's probability to be chosen as formateur is proportional to its size.
(3) There is a signi¯cant incumbency advantage. That is, controlling for seat share a party is about 27% more likely to be selected again if it can count the last government's prime minister among its members.
Formateur selection rules are an important building block of formal models of government formation. But the importance of these rules is not just con¯ned to questions of modelling 13 The individual estimates of the size elasticity and the incumbency premium by attempt and number of parties, not reported here, are available from the authors.
assumptions. In multi-party democracies, the choice of executive is typically not determined by an election alone. No party commands a majority of seats and there are typically many viable coalition governments. This makes the selection of a formateur a decision with important political consequences. For example, if changes in electoral outcomes do not lead to likely corresponding changes in government composition, voters may perceive this as a lack of control over their elected representatives. Incumbency e®ects, for instance, isolate governing parties from electoral outcomes. Concerns like these may lead to a constitutional crisis as recently witnessed in Italy.
